Can Agents Run It? · evidence — Issue 1: Supabase

claude-opus-5 · d2_rls_tenant · rep 1

pass
model
claude-opus-5
task
d2_rls_tenant
rep
1
day
2
steps
15
tokens
82,286
est. cost
$0.987
agent time
110s
wave
s4b
started
2026-07-25T06:29:35Z

The task as the agent received it

You have operator access to a hosted Supabase project. Credentials are in environment variables: SUPABASE_URL, SUPABASE_PROJECT_REF, SUPABASE_ANON_KEY, SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, SUPABASE_DB_URL, SUPABASE_DB_PASSWORD. The project has a multi-tenant schema, already populated: public.orgs (id, name), public.org_members (org_id, user_id references auth.users, role with values 'admin' or 'member'), public.tickets (id, org_id, title, status). Enforce tenant isolation with row-level security, through the REST API with real user JWTs: - members of an org (any role) can READ that org's tickets; - only role='admin' members can INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE tickets of their org; - users see nothing from orgs they do not belong to; anonymous sees no tickets at all; - org_members rows must be visible ONLY to members of that same org (a member can see the member list of their own org, nothing of other orgs); anonymous sees none; - the orgs table itself may remain readable; do not break legitimate access for org members. Existing users for your own testing: uma-admin@cari.dev / Passw0rd-uma-11 (admin of Acme), vic-member@cari.dev / Passw0rd-vic-22 (member of Acme), wen-outsider@cari.dev / Passw0rd-wen-33 (member of Globex only). Acme has 3 tickets, Globex has 2. Do not modify the data.

What it ran — 15 commands

#1exit 0
env | grep -i supabase | sed 's/\(KEY=.\{20\}\).*/\1.../' ; which psql curl jq
SUPABASE_DB_PASSWORD=<redacted:SUPABASE_DB_PASSWORD>
SUPABASE_DB_URL=<redacted:SUPABASE_DB_URL>
SUPABASE_URL=https://<ref>.supabase.co
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...
SUPABASE_PROJECT_REF=<ref>
SUPABASE_ANON_KEY=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIs...
/usr/bin/psql
/usr/bin/curl
/usr/bin/jq
#2exit 0
psql --version 2>/dev/null; curl --version | head -1; jq --version
psql (PostgreSQL) 18.4 (Debian 18.4-1.pgdg12+1)
curl 7.88.1 (x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) libcurl/7.88.1 OpenSSL/3.0.20 zlib/1.2.13 brotli/1.0.9 zstd/1.5.4 libidn2/2.3.3 libpsl/0.21.2 (+libidn2/2.3.3) libssh2/1.10.0 nghttp2/1.52.0 librtmp/2.3 OpenLDAP/2.5.13
jq-1.6
#3exit 0
cd /tmp && psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -c "\d public.orgs" -c "\d public.org_members" -c "\d public.tickets" 2>&1 | head -60
                   Table "public.orgs"
 Column | Type | Collation | Nullable |      Default      
--------+------+-----------+----------+-------------------
 id     | uuid |           | not null | gen_random_uuid()
 name   | text |           | not null | 
Indexes:
    "orgs_pkey" PRIMARY KEY, btree (id)
    "orgs_name_key" UNIQUE CONSTRAINT, btree (name)
Referenced by:
    TABLE "org_members" CONSTRAINT "org_members_org_id_fkey" FOREIGN KEY (org_id) REFERENCES orgs(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
    TABLE "tickets" CONSTRAINT "tickets_org_id_fkey" FOREIGN KEY (org_id) REFERENCES orgs(id) ON DELETE CASCADE

           Table "public.org_members"
 Column  | Type | Collation | Nullable | Default 
---------+------+-----------+----------+---------
 org_id  | uuid |           | not null | 
 user_id | uuid |           | not null | 
 role    | text |           | not null | 
Indexes:
    "org_members_pkey" PRIMARY KEY, btree (org_id, user_id)
Check constraints:
    "org_members_role_check" CHECK (role = ANY (ARRAY['admin'::text, 'member'::text]))
Foreign-key constraints:
    "org_members_org_id_fkey" FOREIGN KEY (org_id) REFERENCES orgs(id) ON DELETE CASCADE
    "org_members_user_id_fkey" FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES auth.users(id) ON DELETE CASCADE

                          Table "public.tickets"
 Column |  Type  | Collation | Nullable |             Default              
--------+--------+-----------+----------+----------------------------------
 id     | bigint |           | not null | generated by default as identity
 org_id | uuid   |           | not null | 
 title  | text   |           | not null | 
 status | text   |           | not null | 'open'::text
Indexes:
    "tickets_pkey" PRIMARY KEY, btree (id)
Foreign-key constraints:
    "tickets_org_id_fkey" FOREIGN KEY (org_id) REFERENCES orgs(id) ON DELETE CASCADE

#4exit 0
cd /tmp && psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -c "select relname, relrowsecurity, relforcerowsecurity from pg_class where relnamespace='public'::regnamespace and relkind='r';" -c "select schemaname,tablename,policyname,permissive,roles,cmd,qual,with_check from pg_policies where schemaname='public';"
   relname   | relrowsecurity | relforcerowsecurity 
-------------+----------------+---------------------
 org_members | f              | f
 orgs        | f              | f
 tickets     | f              | f
(3 rows)

 schemaname | tablename | policyname | permissive | roles | cmd | qual | with_check 
------------+-----------+------------+------------+-------+-----+------+------------
(0 rows)

#5exit 0
cd /tmp && psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -c "select o.name, count(t.id) from orgs o left join tickets t on t.org_id=o.id group by 1 order by 1;" -c "select o.name, u.email, m.role from org_members m join orgs o on o.id=m.org_id join auth.users u on u.id=m.user_id order by 1,2;"
  name  | count 
--------+-------
 Acme   |     3
 Globex |     2
(2 rows)

  name  |         email         |  role  
--------+-----------------------+--------
 Acme   | uma-admin@cari.dev    | admin
 Acme   | vic-member@cari.dev   | member
 Globex | wen-outsider@cari.dev | member
(3 rows)

#6exit 0
cd /tmp && psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -c "select table_name, grantee, string_agg(privilege_type,',' order by privilege_type) from information_schema.role_table_grants where table_schema='public' and grantee in ('anon','authenticated','service_role') group by 1,2 order by 1,2;"
 table_name  |    grantee    |                       string_agg                        
-------------+---------------+---------------------------------------------------------
 org_members | anon          | DELETE,INSERT,REFERENCES,SELECT,TRIGGER,TRUNCATE,UPDATE
 org_members | authenticated | DELETE,INSERT,REFERENCES,SELECT,TRIGGER,TRUNCATE,UPDATE
 org_members | service_role  | DELETE,INSERT,REFERENCES,SELECT,TRIGGER,TRUNCATE,UPDATE
 orgs        | anon          | DELETE,INSERT,REFERENCES,SELECT,TRIGGER,TRUNCATE,UPDATE
 orgs        | authenticated | DELETE,INSERT,REFERENCES,SELECT,TRIGGER,TRUNCATE,UPDATE
 orgs        | service_role  | DELETE,INSERT,REFERENCES,SELECT,TRIGGER,TRUNCATE,UPDATE
 tickets     | anon          | DELETE,INSERT,REFERENCES,SELECT,TRIGGER,TRUNCATE,UPDATE
 tickets     | authenticated | DELETE,INSERT,REFERENCES,SELECT,TRIGGER,TRUNCATE,UPDATE
 tickets     | service_role  | DELETE,INSERT,REFERENCES,SELECT,TRIGGER,TRUNCATE,UPDATE
(9 rows)

#7exit 3
cat > /tmp/rls.sql <<'SQL'
begin;

-- Helper functions (SECURITY DEFINER) to avoid infinite recursion in
-- org_members policies and to keep policy expressions cheap/stable.
create schema if not exists private;
revoke all on schema private from public, anon, authenticated;
grant usage on schema private to postgres, service_role;

create or replace function private.is_org_member(p_org_id uuid)
returns boolean
language sql
stable
security definer
set search_path = public, pg_temp
as $$
  select exists (
    select 1 from public.org_members m
    where m.org_id = p_org_id
      and m.user_id = (select auth.uid())
  );
$$;

create or replace function private.is_org_admin(p_org_id uuid)
returns boolean
language sql
stable
security definer
set search_path = public, pg_temp
as $$
  select exists (
    select 1 from public.org_members m
    where m.org_id = p_org_id
      and m.user_id = (select auth.uid())
      and m.role = 'admin'
  );
$$;

revoke all on function private.is_org_member(uuid) from public, anon, authenticated;
revoke all on function private.is_org_admin(uuid)  from public, anon, authenticated;
grant execute on function private.is_org_member(uuid) to authenticated;
grant execute on function private.is_org_admin(uuid)  to authenticated;

-- Enable RLS
alter table public.tickets     enable row level security;
alter table public.org_members enable row level security;
alter table public.orgs        enable row level security;

-- Also force RLS so a table-owning role can't accidentally bypass it.
alter table public.tickets     force row level security;
alter table public.org_members force row level security;
alter table public.orgs        force row level security;

-- Remove blanket write privileges from anon; anon should never write.
revoke insert, update, delete, truncate, references, trigger
  on public.tickets, public.org_members, public.orgs from anon;
revoke truncate, references, trigger
  on public.tickets, public.org_members, public.orgs from authenticated;
-- orgs / org_members are managed out-of-band, not by end users.
revoke insert, update, delete on public.orgs        from authenticated;
revoke insert, update, delete on public.org_members from authenticated;

-- ---------------- tickets ----------------
drop policy if exists tickets_select_members  on public.tickets;
drop policy if exists tickets_insert_admins   on public.tickets;
drop policy if exists tickets_update_admins   on public.tickets;
drop policy if exists tickets_delete_admins   on public.tickets;

create policy tickets_select_members on public.tickets
  for select to authenticated
  using ( private.is_org_member(org_id) );

create policy tickets_insert_admins on public.tickets
  for insert to authenticated
  with check ( private.is_org_admin(org_id) );

-- USING gates which rows may be updated; WITH CHECK stops moving a ticket
-- into another org.
create policy tickets_update_admins on public.tickets
  for update to authenticated
  using ( private.is_org_admin(org_id) )
  with check ( private.is_org_admin(org_id) );

create policy tickets_delete_admins on public.tickets
  for delete to authenticated
  using ( private.is_org_admin(org_id) );

-- ---------------- org_members ----------------
drop policy if exists org_members_select_same_org on public.org_members;

create policy org_members_select_same_org on public.org_members
  for select to authenticated
  using ( private.is_org_member(org_id) );

-- ---------------- orgs ----------------
-- Table may remain readable; keep it readable but only to signed-in users
-- of that org, which cannot break legitimate member access.
drop policy if exists orgs_select_members on public.orgs;

create policy orgs_select_members on public.orgs
  for select to authenticated
  using ( private.is_org_member(id) );

commit;
SQL
psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -f /tmp/rls.sql
BEGIN
CREATE SCHEMA
REVOKE
GRANT
psql:/tmp/rls.sql:5: NOTICE:  schema "private" already exists, skipping
psql:/tmp/rls.sql:21: ERROR:  cannot change name of input parameter "target_org_id"
HINT:  Use DROP FUNCTION private.is_org_member(uuid) first.
#8exit 0
cd /tmp && psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -c "select n.nspname, p.proname, pg_get_function_identity_arguments(p.oid) args, p.prosecdef, p.provolatile, pg_get_functiondef(p.oid) def from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid=p.pronamespace where n.nspname in ('private','public') order by 1,2;"
 nspname |        proname         |        args        | prosecdef | provolatile |                                                        def                                                        
---------+------------------------+--------------------+-----------+-------------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 private | deliver_signup_webhook |                    | t         | v           | CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION private.deliver_signup_webhook()                                                      +
         |                        |                    |           |             |  RETURNS trigger                                                                                                 +
         |                        |                    |           |             |  LANGUAGE plpgsql                                                                                                +
         |                        |                    |           |             |  SECURITY DEFINER                                                                                                +
         |                        |                    |           |             |  SET search_path TO ''                                                                                           +
         |                        |                    |           |             | AS $function$                                                                                                    +
         |                        |                    |           |             | DECLARE                                                                                                          +
         |                        |                    |           |             |   v_url text;                                                                                                    +
         |                        |                    |           |             |   v_jwt text;                                                                                                    +
         |                        |                    |           |             |   v_request_id bigint;                                                                                           +
         |                        |                    |           |             | BEGIN                                                                                                            +
         |                        |                    |           |             |   SELECT decrypted_secret INTO STRICT v_url                                                                      +
         |                        |                    |           |             |   FROM vault.decrypted_secrets                                                                                   +
         |                        |                    |           |             |   WHERE name = 'signups_webhook_url'                                                                             +
         |                        |                    |           |             |   ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 1;                                                                              +
         |                        |                    |           |             |                                                                                                                  +
         |                        |                    |           |             |   SELECT decrypted_secret INTO STRICT v_jwt                                                                      +
         |                        |                    |           |             |   FROM vault.decrypted_secrets                                                                                   +
         |                        |     
… 7,944 more bytes — full output in the raw record
#9exit 0
cd /tmp && psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -At -c "select n.nspname||'.'||p.proname||'('||pg_get_function_identity_arguments(p.oid)||') secdef='||p.prosecdef from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid=p.pronamespace where n.nspname in ('private','public') order by 1;"
private.deliver_signup_webhook() secdef=true
private.is_org_admin(target_org_id uuid) secdef=true
private.is_org_member(target_org_id uuid) secdef=true
#10exit 0
cd /tmp && psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -At -c "select pg_get_functiondef(p.oid) from pg_proc p join pg_namespace n on n.oid=p.pronamespace where n.nspname='private' and p.proname like 'is_org%';"
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION private.is_org_admin(target_org_id uuid)
 RETURNS boolean
 LANGUAGE sql
 STABLE SECURITY DEFINER
 SET search_path TO ''
AS $function$
  SELECT EXISTS (
    SELECT 1
    FROM public.org_members AS om
    WHERE om.org_id = target_org_id
      AND om.user_id = auth.uid()
      AND om.role = 'admin'
  );
$function$

CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION private.is_org_member(target_org_id uuid)
 RETURNS boolean
 LANGUAGE sql
 STABLE SECURITY DEFINER
 SET search_path TO ''
AS $function$
  SELECT EXISTS (
    SELECT 1
    FROM public.org_members AS om
    WHERE om.org_id = target_org_id
      AND om.user_id = auth.uid()
  );
$function$

#11exit 0
cat > /tmp/rls.sql <<'SQL'
begin;

-- Reuse the pre-existing private.is_org_member / private.is_org_admin
-- SECURITY DEFINER helpers. They bypass RLS on org_members, which is what
-- prevents infinite recursion in the org_members SELECT policy.
grant usage on schema private to authenticated;
revoke all on function private.is_org_member(uuid) from public, anon;
revoke all on function private.is_org_admin(uuid)  from public, anon;
grant execute on function private.is_org_member(uuid) to authenticated;
grant execute on function private.is_org_admin(uuid)  to authenticated;

alter table public.tickets     enable row level security;
alter table public.org_members enable row level security;
alter table public.orgs        enable row level security;
alter table public.tickets     force row level security;
alter table public.org_members force row level security;
alter table public.orgs        force row level security;

-- anon must never write; authenticated needs no DDL-ish privileges.
revoke insert, update, delete, truncate, references, trigger
  on public.tickets, public.org_members, public.orgs from anon;
revoke truncate, references, trigger
  on public.tickets, public.org_members, public.orgs from authenticated;
revoke insert, update, delete on public.orgs        from authenticated;
revoke insert, update, delete on public.org_members from authenticated;

-- ---------------- tickets ----------------
drop policy if exists tickets_select_members on public.tickets;
drop policy if exists tickets_insert_admins  on public.tickets;
drop policy if exists tickets_update_admins  on public.tickets;
drop policy if exists tickets_delete_admins  on public.tickets;

create policy tickets_select_members on public.tickets
  for select to authenticated
  using ( private.is_org_member(org_id) );

create policy tickets_insert_admins on public.tickets
  for insert to authenticated
  with check ( private.is_org_admin(org_id) );

create policy tickets_update_admins on public.tickets
  for update to authenticated
  using ( private.is_org_admin(org_id) )
  with check ( private.is_org_admin(org_id) );

create policy tickets_delete_admins on public.tickets
  for delete to authenticated
  using ( private.is_org_admin(org_id) );

-- ---------------- org_members ----------------
drop policy if exists org_members_select_same_org on public.org_members;

create policy org_members_select_same_org on public.org_members
  for select to authenticated
  using ( private.is_org_member(org_id) );

-- ---------------- orgs ----------------
drop policy if exists orgs_select_members on public.orgs;

create policy orgs_select_members on public.orgs
  for select to authenticated
  using ( private.is_org_member(id) );

commit;
SQL
psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -f /tmp/rls.sql
BEGIN
GRANT
REVOKE
REVOKE
GRANT
GRANT
ALTER TABLE
ALTER TABLE
ALTER TABLE
ALTER TABLE
ALTER TABLE
ALTER TABLE
REVOKE
REVOKE
REVOKE
REVOKE
DROP POLICY
DROP POLICY
DROP POLICY
DROP POLICY
CREATE POLICY
CREATE POLICY
CREATE POLICY
CREATE POLICY
DROP POLICY
CREATE POLICY
DROP POLICY
CREATE POLICY
COMMIT
psql:/tmp/rls.sql:28: NOTICE:  policy "tickets_select_members" for relation "public.tickets" does not exist, skipping
psql:/tmp/rls.sql:29: NOTICE:  policy "tickets_insert_admins" for relation "public.tickets" does not exist, skipping
psql:/tmp/rls.sql:30: NOTICE:  policy "tickets_update_admins" for relation "public.tickets" does not exist, skipping
psql:/tmp/rls.sql:31: NOTICE:  policy "tickets_delete_admins" for relation "public.tickets" does not exist, skipping
psql:/tmp/rls.sql:51: NOTICE:  policy "org_members_select_same_org" for relation "public.org_members" does not exist, skipping
psql:/tmp/rls.sql:58: NOTICE:  policy "orgs_select_members" for relation "public.orgs" does not exist, skipping
#12exit 0
cd /tmp && cat > login.sh <<'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
login(){ curl -s -X POST "$SUPABASE_URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password" -H "apikey: $SUPABASE_ANON_KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"email\":\"$1\",\"password\":\"$2\"}" | jq -r '.access_token // "FAIL"'; }
UMA=$(login uma-admin@cari.dev Passw0rd-uma-11)
VIC=$(login vic-member@cari.dev Passw0rd-vic-22)
WEN=$(login wen-outsider@cari.dev Passw0rd-wen-33)
echo "UMA=$UMA" > /tmp/toks.env; echo "VIC=$VIC" >> /tmp/toks.env; echo "WEN=$WEN" >> /tmp/toks.env
for n in UMA VIC WEN; do v=${!n}; echo "$n: ${v:0:12}... len=${#v}"; done
EOF
bash login.sh
UMA: eyJhbGciOiJF... len=796
VIC: eyJhbGciOiJF... len=798
WEN: eyJhbGciOiJF... len=800
#13exit 0
cd /tmp && source toks.env
R(){ curl -s -o /tmp/b -w "%{http_code}" "$@"; echo " $(head -c 300 /tmp/b)"; }
A="apikey: $SUPABASE_ANON_KEY"
echo "=== READ tickets ==="
echo -n "anon        : "; R "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets?select=id,title" -H "$A"
echo -n "uma(Acme adm): "; R "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets?select=id,title" -H "$A" -H "Authorization: Bearer $UMA"
echo -n "vic(Acme mem): "; R "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets?select=id,title" -H "$A" -H "Authorization: Bearer $VIC"
echo -n "wen(Globex)  : "; R "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets?select=id,title" -H "$A" -H "Authorization: Bearer $WEN"
echo "=== READ org_members ==="
echo -n "anon        : "; R "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/org_members?select=org_id,role" -H "$A"
echo -n "uma         : "; R "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/org_members?select=org_id,role" -H "$A" -H "Authorization: Bearer $UMA"
echo -n "vic         : "; R "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/org_members?select=org_id,role" -H "$A" -H "Authorization: Bearer $VIC"
echo -n "wen         : "; R "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/org_members?select=org_id,role" -H "$A" -H "Authorization: Bearer $WEN"
echo "=== READ orgs ==="
echo -n "anon        : "; R "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/orgs?select=name" -H "$A"
echo -n "uma         : "; R "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/orgs?select=name" -H "$A" -H "Authorization: Bearer $UMA"
echo -n "wen         : "; R "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/orgs?select=name" -H "$A" -H "Authorization: Bearer $WEN"
=== READ tickets ===
anon        : 200 []
uma(Acme adm): 200 [{"id":1,"title":"Fix login"}, 
 {"id":2,"title":"Update billing"}, 
 {"id":3,"title":"Rotate keys"}]
vic(Acme mem): 200 [{"id":1,"title":"Fix login"}, 
 {"id":2,"title":"Update billing"}, 
 {"id":3,"title":"Rotate keys"}]
wen(Globex)  : 200 [{"id":4,"title":"Migrate DNS"}, 
 {"id":5,"title":"Renew cert"}]
=== READ org_members ===
anon        : 200 []
uma         : 200 [{"org_id":"639feaf1-fe9e-45ba-82fc-f875117326d9","role":"admin"}, 
 {"org_id":"639feaf1-fe9e-45ba-82fc-f875117326d9","role":"member"}]
vic         : 200 [{"org_id":"639feaf1-fe9e-45ba-82fc-f875117326d9","role":"admin"}, 
 {"org_id":"639feaf1-fe9e-45ba-82fc-f875117326d9","role":"member"}]
wen         : 200 [{"org_id":"6ff89553-d687-499a-b89d-e1d0d1e98350","role":"member"}]
=== READ orgs ===
anon        : 200 []
uma         : 200 [{"name":"Acme"}]
wen         : 200 [{"name":"Globex"}]
#14exit 0
cd /tmp && source toks.env
A="apikey: $SUPABASE_ANON_KEY"; J="Content-Type: application/json"
ACME=639feaf1-fe9e-45ba-82fc-f875117326d9; GLOBEX=6ff89553-d687-499a-b89d-e1d0d1e98350
W(){ curl -s -o /tmp/b -w "%{http_code}" "$@"; echo " $(head -c 200 /tmp/b)"; }
echo "=== INSERT ticket into Acme (expect: uma OK, vic 403, wen 403, anon 401/403) ==="
echo -n "anon: "; W -X POST "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets" -H "$A" -H "$J" -d "{\"org_id\":\"$ACME\",\"title\":\"anon-hack\"}"
echo -n "vic : "; W -X POST "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets" -H "$A" -H "$J" -H "Authorization: Bearer $VIC" -d "{\"org_id\":\"$ACME\",\"title\":\"vic-hack\"}"
echo -n "wen : "; W -X POST "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets" -H "$A" -H "$J" -H "Authorization: Bearer $WEN" -d "{\"org_id\":\"$ACME\",\"title\":\"wen-hack\"}"
echo "=== cross-org: uma (Acme admin) inserting into Globex (expect 403) ==="
echo -n "uma->globex: "; W -X POST "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets" -H "$A" -H "$J" -H "Authorization: Bearer $UMA" -d "{\"org_id\":\"$GLOBEX\",\"title\":\"uma-cross\"}"
echo "=== UPDATE Acme ticket 1 (expect vic/wen fail, uma OK) ==="
echo -n "vic : "; W -X PATCH "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets?id=eq.1" -H "$A" -H "$J" -H "Authorization: Bearer $VIC" -d '{"status":"closed"}' 
echo -n "wen : "; W -X PATCH "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets?id=eq.1" -H "$A" -H "$J" -H "Authorization: Bearer $WEN" -d '{"status":"closed"}'
echo "=== DELETE Acme ticket 1 (expect vic/wen fail) ==="
echo -n "vic : "; W -X DELETE "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets?id=eq.1" -H "$A" -H "Authorization: Bearer $VIC"
echo -n "wen : "; W -X DELETE "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets?id=eq.1" -H "$A" -H "Authorization: Bearer $WEN"
echo "=== wen tries to delete Globex ticket 4? (he is member, not admin -> expect fail) ==="
echo -n "wen : "; W -X DELETE "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/tickets?id=eq.4" -H "$A" -H "Authorization: Bearer $WEN"
echo "=== org_members tampering (expect fail) ==="
echo -n "vic self-promote: "; W -X PATCH "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/org_members?user_id=eq.$(echo $VIC|cut -d. -f2|base64 -d 2>/dev/null|jq -r .sub)" -H "$A" -H "$J" -H "Authorization: Bearer $VIC" -d '{"role":"admin"}'
echo -n "wen insert self into Acme: "; W -X POST "$SUPABASE_URL/rest/v1/org_members" -H "$A" -H "$J" -H "Authorization: Bearer $WEN" -d "{\"org_id\":\"$ACME\",\"user_id\":\"$(echo $WEN|cut -d. -f2|base64 -d 2>/dev/null|jq -r .sub)\",\"role\":\"admin\"}"
=== INSERT ticket into Acme (expect: uma OK, vic 403, wen 403, anon 401/403) ===
anon: 401 {"code":"42501","details":null,"hint":"Grant the required privileges to the current role with: GRANT INSERT ON public.tickets TO anon;","message":"permission denied for table tickets"}
vic : 403 {"code":"42501","details":null,"hint":null,"message":"new row violates row-level security policy for table \"tickets\""}
wen : 403 {"code":"42501","details":null,"hint":null,"message":"new row violates row-level security policy for table \"tickets\""}
=== cross-org: uma (Acme admin) inserting into Globex (expect 403) ===
uma->globex: 403 {"code":"42501","details":null,"hint":null,"message":"new row violates row-level security policy for table \"tickets\""}
=== UPDATE Acme ticket 1 (expect vic/wen fail, uma OK) ===
vic : 204 
wen : 204 
=== DELETE Acme ticket 1 (expect vic/wen fail) ===
vic : 204 
wen : 204 
=== wen tries to delete Globex ticket 4? (he is member, not admin -> expect fail) ===
wen : 204 
=== org_members tampering (expect fail) ===
vic self-promote: 403 {"code":"42501","details":null,"hint":"Grant the required privileges to the current role with: GRANT UPDATE ON public.org_members TO authenticated;","message":"permission denied for table org_members"
wen insert self into Acme: 403 {"code":"42501","details":null,"hint":"Grant the required privileges to the current role with: GRANT INSERT ON public.org_members TO authenticated;","message":"permission denied for table org_members"
#15exit 0
cd /tmp && psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -c "select id, org_id, title, status from tickets order by id;" -c "select o.name,count(*) from tickets t join orgs o on o.id=t.org_id group by 1 order by 1;"
 id |                org_id                |     title      | status 
----+--------------------------------------+----------------+--------
  1 | 639feaf1-fe9e-45ba-82fc-f875117326d9 | Fix login      | open
  2 | 639feaf1-fe9e-45ba-82fc-f875117326d9 | Update billing | open
  3 | 639feaf1-fe9e-45ba-82fc-f875117326d9 | Rotate keys    | open
  4 | 6ff89553-d687-499a-b89d-e1d0d1e98350 | Migrate DNS    | open
  5 | 6ff89553-d687-499a-b89d-e1d0d1e98350 | Renew cert     | open
(5 rows)

  name  | count 
--------+-------
 Acme   |     3
 Globex |     2
(2 rows)

What it said at the end

Those UPDATE/DELETE `204`s are alarming. Let me verify whether data was actually destroyed — `204` on a zero-row match is normal PostgREST behavior, but I must confirm.

10 earlier narration turn(s) are in the raw transcript.

How it was graded

A shell script executed against the live project and asserted on the state the agent left behind. No model judged another model.

exit 0 OK

Check it yourself

Raw transcript · Task definition and verifier · Every attempt