Can Agents Run It? · evidence — Issue 1: Supabase

moonshotai/kimi-k3 · d2_rls_tenant · rep 2

pass

model

moonshotai/kimi-k3

task

d2_rls_tenant

rep

day

steps

tokens

60,080

est. cost

$0.451

agent time

245s

wave

started

2026-07-24T14:40:46Z

The task as the agent received it

You have operator access to a hosted Supabase project. Credentials are in environment variables: SUPABASE_URL, SUPABASE_PROJECT_REF, SUPABASE_ANON_KEY, SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, SUPABASE_DB_URL, SUPABASE_DB_PASSWORD. The project has a multi-tenant schema, already populated: public.orgs (id, name), public.org_members (org_id, user_id references auth.users, role with values 'admin' or 'member'), public.tickets (id, org_id, title, status). Enforce tenant isolation with row-level security, through the REST API with real user JWTs: - members of an org (any role) can READ that org's tickets; - only role='admin' members can INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE tickets of their org; - users see nothing from orgs they do not belong to; anonymous sees no tickets at all; - org_members rows must be visible ONLY to members of that same org (a member can see the member list of their own org, nothing of other orgs); anonymous sees none; - the orgs table itself may remain readable; do not break legitimate access for org members. Existing users for your own testing: uma-admin@cari.dev / Passw0rd-uma-11 (admin of Acme), vic-member@cari.dev / Passw0rd-vic-22 (member of Acme), wen-outsider@cari.dev / Passw0rd-wen-33 (member of Globex only). Acme has 3 tickets, Globex has 2. Do not modify the data.

What it ran — 11 commands

#1exit 0

env | grep -i supabase | sed 's/=.*/=<set>/' && echo '---' && echo "URL: $SUPABASE_URL" && echo "REF: $SUPABASE_PROJECT_REF"

SUPABASE_DB_PASSWORD=<set>
SUPABASE_DB_URL=<set>
SUPABASE_URL=<set>
SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY=<set>
SUPABASE_PROJECT_REF=<set>
SUPABASE_ANON_KEY=<set>
---
URL: https://<ref>.supabase.co
REF: <ref>

#2exit 0

which psql || (apt-get install -y postgresql-client 2>/dev/null | tail -1); echo "---"; echo "DB_URL: ${SUPABASE_DB_URL}" | sed 's/:[^:@]*@/:<hidden>@/'

/usr/bin/psql
---
DB_URL: postgresql://postgres.<ref>:<hidden>@aws-0-us-east-1.pooler.supabase.com:5432/postgres

#3exit 0

export PGPASSWORD="$SUPABASE_DB_PASSWORD"
psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -X -A -c "
SELECT schemaname, tablename, rowsecurity FROM pg_tables WHERE schemaname='public' AND tablename IN ('orgs','org_members','tickets');
" -c "
SELECT polname, polpermissive, polcmd, polroles, qual, with_check FROM pg_policies WHERE schemaname='public' ORDER BY tablename, polname;
" -c "
SELECT n.nspname, p.proname, pg_get_function_arguments(p.oid) FROM pg_proc p JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid=p.pronamespace WHERE n.nspname IN ('public','auth') AND p.proname ILIKE '%member%';
"

schemaname|tablename|rowsecurity
public|org_members|f
public|orgs|f
public|tickets|f
(3 rows)
nspname|proname|pg_get_function_arguments
(0 rows)

ERROR:  column "polname" does not exist
LINE 2: SELECT polname, polpermissive, polcmd, polroles, qual, with_...
               ^
HINT:  Perhaps you meant to reference the column "pg_policies.policyname".

#4exit 0

export PGPASSWORD="$SUPABASE_DB_PASSWORD"
psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -X -A -c "
SELECT policyname, permissive, cmd, roles, qual, with_check FROM pg_policies WHERE schemaname='public';
" -c "
SELECT column_name, data_type, is_nullable FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_schema='public' AND table_name IN ('orgs','org_members','tickets') ORDER BY table_name, ordinal_position;
" -c "
SELECT o.name AS org, m.role, u.email FROM public.org_members m JOIN public.orgs o ON o.id=m.org_id JOIN auth.users u ON u.id=m.user_id ORDER BY o.name, m.role;
" -c "
SELECT o.name, count(t.id) AS tickets FROM public.orgs o LEFT JOIN public.tickets t ON t.org_id=o.id GROUP BY o.name ORDER BY o.name;
" -c "SELECT grantee, table_name, privilege_type FROM information_schema.role_table_grants WHERE table_schema='public' AND table_name IN ('orgs','org_members','tickets') AND grantee IN ('anon','authenticated') ORDER BY table_name, grantee, privilege_type;"

policyname|permissive|cmd|roles|qual|with_check
(0 rows)
column_name|data_type|is_nullable
org_id|uuid|NO
user_id|uuid|NO
role|text|NO
id|uuid|NO
name|text|NO
id|bigint|NO
org_id|uuid|NO
title|text|NO
status|text|NO
(9 rows)
org|role|email
Acme|admin|uma-admin@cari.dev
Acme|member|vic-member@cari.dev
Globex|member|wen-outsider@cari.dev
(3 rows)
name|tickets
Acme|3
Globex|2
(2 rows)
grantee|table_name|privilege_type
anon|org_members|DELETE
anon|org_members|INSERT
anon|org_members|REFERENCES
anon|org_members|SELECT
anon|org_members|TRIGGER
anon|org_members|TRUNCATE
anon|org_members|UPDATE
authenticated|org_members|DELETE
authenticated|org_members|INSERT
authenticated|org_members|REFERENCES
authenticated|org_members|SELECT
authenticated|org_members|TRIGGER
authenticated|org_members|TRUNCATE
authenticated|org_members|UPDATE
anon|orgs|DELETE
anon|orgs|INSERT
anon|orgs|REFERENCES
anon|orgs|SELECT
anon|orgs|TRIGGER
anon|orgs|TRUNCATE
anon|orgs|UPDATE
authenticated|orgs|DELETE
authenticated|orgs|INSERT
authenticated|orgs|REFERENCES
authenticated|orgs|SELECT
authenticated|orgs|TRIGGER
authenticated|orgs|TRUNCATE
authenticated|orgs|UPDATE
anon|tickets|DELETE
anon|tickets|INSERT
anon|tickets|REFERENCES
anon|tickets|SELECT
anon|tickets|TRIGGER
anon|tickets|TRUNCATE
anon|tickets|UPDATE
authenticated|tickets|DELETE
authenticated|tickets|INSERT
authenticated|tickets|REFERENCES
authenticated|tickets|SELECT
authenticated|tickets|TRIGGER
authenticated|tickets|TRUNCATE
authenticated|tickets|UPDATE
(42 rows)

#5exit 0

mkdir -p /opt/rls && cat > /opt/rls/migration.sql <<'SQL'
-- ============================================================================
-- Multi-tenant tenant isolation via Row-Level Security
-- Tables: public.orgs, public.org_members, public.tickets
-- Rules:
--   * org members (any role)  : READ tickets of their org
--   * org admins only         : INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE tickets of their org
--   * non-members / anonymous : see no tickets
--   * org_members rows        : visible only to members of the same org;
--                               anonymous sees none
--   * orgs                    : stays readable (unchanged behaviour)
-- ============================================================================

BEGIN;

-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 1. SECURITY DEFINER helpers (owned by postgres -> bypass RLS on org_members,
--    so policies on org_members can self-reference without infinite recursion).
--    Not granted to API roles; callable only from within policies.
-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.is_org_member(p_org_id uuid)
RETURNS boolean
LANGUAGE sql
STABLE
SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = public
AS $$
  SELECT EXISTS (
    SELECT 1
    FROM public.org_members m
    WHERE m.org_id = p_org_id
      AND m.user_id = auth.uid()
  );
$$;

CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION public.is_org_admin(p_org_id uuid)
RETURNS boolean
LANGUAGE sql
STABLE
SECURITY DEFINER
SET search_path = public
AS $$
  SELECT EXISTS (
    SELECT 1
    FROM public.org_members m
    WHERE m.org_id = p_org_id
      AND m.user_id = auth.uid()
      AND m.role = 'admin'
  );
$$;

REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.is_org_member(uuid) FROM PUBLIC, anon, authenticated;
REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION public.is_org_admin(uuid)  FROM PUBLIC, anon, authenticated;

-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 2. Enable RLS on all three tables.
-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
ALTER TABLE public.tickets     ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE public.org_members ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;
ALTER TABLE public.orgs        ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 3. tickets policies
-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- READ: any member (admin or member role) of the ticket's org.
CREATE POLICY tickets_select_member
  ON public.tickets FOR SELECT
  TO authenticated
  USING (public.is_org_member(org_id));

-- INSERT: only admins of the org; new row must belong to an org they admin.
CREATE POLICY tickets_insert_admin
  ON public.tickets FOR INSERT
  TO authenticated
  WITH CHECK (public.is_org_admin(org_id));

-- UPDATE: only admins; row must be in their org before AND after the change
-- (USING gates the existing row, WITH CHECK gates the new values).
CREATE POLICY tickets_update_admin
  ON public.tickets FOR UPDATE
  TO authenticated
  USING (public.is_org_admin(org_id))
  WITH CHECK (public.is_org_admin(org_id));

-- DELETE: only admins of the org.
CREATE POLICY tickets_delete_admin
  ON public.tickets FOR DELETE
  TO authenticated
  USING (public.is_org_admin(org_id));

-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 4. org_members policies
-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- READ: a user sees only rows of orgs they themselves belong to.
-- (helper function is SECURITY DEFINER -> no policy recursion)
CREATE POLICY org_members_select_own_org
  ON public.org_members FOR SELECT
  TO authenticated
  USING (public.is_org_member(org_id));

-- No INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE policies for API roles on org_members:
-- membership management stays server-side (service_role bypasses RLS).

-- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
-- 5. orgs policies -- "

… 450 more bytes — full output in the raw record

migration written
114 /opt/rls/migration.sql

#6exit 0

export PGPASSWORD="$SUPABASE_DB_PASSWORD"
psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -X -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -f /opt/rls/migration.sql && echo "=== APPLIED ===" && psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -X -A -c "
SELECT tablename, rowsecurity FROM pg_tables WHERE schemaname='public' AND tablename IN ('orgs','org_members','tickets') ORDER BY tablename;
" -c "
SELECT tablename, policyname, cmd, roles FROM pg_policies WHERE schemaname='public' ORDER BY tablename, policyname;
"

BEGIN
CREATE FUNCTION
CREATE FUNCTION
REVOKE
REVOKE
ALTER TABLE
ALTER TABLE
ALTER TABLE
CREATE POLICY
CREATE POLICY
CREATE POLICY
CREATE POLICY
CREATE POLICY
CREATE POLICY
COMMIT
=== APPLIED ===
tablename|rowsecurity
org_members|t
orgs|t
tickets|t
(3 rows)
tablename|policyname|cmd|roles
org_members|org_members_select_own_org|SELECT|{authenticated}
orgs|orgs_select_all|SELECT|{anon,authenticated}
tickets|tickets_delete_admin|DELETE|{authenticated}
tickets|tickets_insert_admin|INSERT|{authenticated}
tickets|tickets_select_member|SELECT|{authenticated}
tickets|tickets_update_admin|UPDATE|{authenticated}
(6 rows)

#7exit 0

cat > /opt/rls/verify.sh <<'SH'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -u
URL="$SUPABASE_URL"; ANON="$SUPABASE_ANON_KEY"
PASS=0; FAIL=0
ok()   { if [ "$1" = "$2" ]; then PASS=$((PASS+1)); echo "PASS: $3 [got=$1]"; else FAIL=$((FAIL+1)); echo "FAIL: $3 [want=$2 got=$1]"; fi; }

login() {
  curl -sS -X POST "$URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password" \
    -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"email\":\"$1\",\"password\":\"$2\"}" | jq -r '.access_token // empty'
}

UMA=$(login uma-admin@cari.dev   'Passw0rd-uma-11')   # Acme admin
VIC=$(login vic-member@cari.dev  'Passw0rd-vic-22')   # Acme member
WEN=$(login wen-outsider@cari.dev 'Passw0rd-wen-33')  # Globex member
[ -n "$UMA" ] && [ -n "$VIC" ] && [ -n "$WEN" ] && echo "All 3 logins OK" || { echo "LOGIN FAILURE"; exit 1; }

ACME=$(curl -sS "$URL/rest/v1/orgs?select=id,name&name=eq.Acme" -H "apikey: $ANON" | jq -r '.[0].id')
GLOBEX=$(curl -sS "$URL/rest/v1/orgs?select=id,name&name=eq.Globex" -H "apikey: $ANON" | jq -r '.[0].id')
echo "Acme=$ACME Globex=$GLOBEX"

t_count() { curl -sS "$URL/rest/v1/tickets?select=id,org_id,title" -H "apikey: $ANON" ${2:+-H "Authorization: Bearer $2"} | jq "if type==\"array\" then [.[]|select(.org_id==\"$1\")]|length else -1 end"; }
t_titles() { curl -sS "$URL/rest/v1/tickets?select=org_id,title" -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Authorization: Bearer $2" | jq -r "[.[]|select(.org_id==\"$1\")|.title]|join(\",\")"; }
m_count() { curl -sS "$URL/rest/v1/org_members?select=org_id,role" -H "apikey: $ANON" ${2:+-H "Authorization: Bearer $2"} | jq "if type==\"array\" then [.[]|select(.org_id==\"$1\")]|length else -1 end"; }

echo; echo "--- 1. TICKET READS ---"
ok "$(t_count "$ACME" "$UMA")"  3 "uma(admin,Acme) reads Acme tickets: $(t_titles "$ACME" "$UMA")"
ok "$(t_count "$ACME" "$VIC")"  3 "vic(member,Acme) reads Acme tickets"
ok "$(t_count "$GLOBEX" "$WEN")" 2 "wen(member,Globex) reads Globex tickets"
ok "$(t_count "$GLOBEX" "$UMA")" 0 "uma sees ZERO Globex tickets"
ok "$(t_count "$GLOBEX" "$VIC")" 0 "vic sees ZERO Globex tickets"
ok "$(t_count "$ACME" "$WEN")"  0 "wen sees ZERO Acme tickets"
ok "$(t_count "$ACME")"         0 "anonymous sees ZERO Acme tickets"
ok "$(t_count "$GLOBEX")"       0 "anonymous sees ZERO Globex tickets"

echo; echo "--- 2. TICKET WRITES ---"
# helper: attempt write, return HTTP status
ins() { curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X POST "$URL/rest/v1/tickets" -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Authorization: Bearer $1" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Prefer: return=minimal" -d "{\"org_id\":\"$2\",\"title\":\"__rls_probe__\",\"status\":\"open\"}"; }
# admin inserts own-org ticket -> 201, then delete it
ST=$(ins "$UMA" "$ACME"); ok "$ST" 201 "uma(admin) INSERT Acme ticket"
NEWID=$(curl -sS "$URL/rest/v1/tickets?select=id&title=eq.__rls_probe__&org_id=eq.$ACME" -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Authorization: Bearer $UMA" | jq -r '.[0].id // empty')
# member insert -> denied (403/401/42501)
ST=$(ins "$VIC" "$ACME"); case "$ST" in 401|403) ok "$ST" "$ST" "vic(member) INSERT Acme denied";; *) ok "$ST" 403 "vic(member) INSERT Acme denied";; esac
# admin insert into OTHER org -> denied
ST=$(ins "$UMA" "$GLOBEX"); case "$ST" in 401|403) ok "$ST" "$ST" "uma(admin) INSERT Globex denied (not her org)";; *) ok "$ST" 403 "uma INSERT Globex denied";; esac
# outsider insert own org as member -> denied
ST=$(ins "$WEN" "$GLOBEX"); case "$ST" in 401|403) ok "$ST" "$ST" "wen(member) INSERT Globex denied";; *) ok "$ST" 403 "wen INSERT Globex denied";; esac

# UPDATE: admin updates own ticket title, then restores
DELCODE() { curl -sS -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' -X PATCH "$URL/rest/v1/tickets?id=eq.$2" -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Authorization: Bearer $1" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "Prefer: return=representation" -d "{\"title\":\"$3\"}"; }
REAL=$(curl -sS "$URL/rest/v1/tickets?select=id,title&org_id=eq.$ACME&id=neq.$NEWID&limit=1" -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Authorization: Bearer $UMA" | jq -r '.[0].id')
REAL_T=$(curl -sS "$URL/rest/v1/tickets?select=t

… 3,878 more bytes — full output in the raw record

All 3 logins OK
Acme=f112a917-8dc5-4c87-baa3-b60922d2c6b2 Globex=0ca3dfe5-cc5d-4343-aee8-320e6ae03f46

--- 1. TICKET READS ---
FAIL: uma(admin,Acme) reads Acme tickets:  [want=3 got=-1]
FAIL: vic(member,Acme) reads Acme tickets [want=3 got=-1]
FAIL: wen(member,Globex) reads Globex tickets [want=2 got=-1]
FAIL: uma sees ZERO Globex tickets [want=0 got=-1]
FAIL: vic sees ZERO Globex tickets [want=0 got=-1]
FAIL: wen sees ZERO Acme tickets [want=0 got=-1]
PASS: anonymous sees ZERO Acme tickets [got=0]
PASS: anonymous sees ZERO Globex tickets [got=0]

--- 2. TICKET WRITES ---
FAIL: uma(admin) INSERT Acme ticket [want=201 got=403]
PASS: vic(member) INSERT Acme denied [got=403]
PASS: uma(admin) INSERT Globex denied (not her org) [got=403]
PASS: wen(member) INSERT Globex denied [got=403]
FAIL: uma(admin) UPDATE own-org ticket [want=1 got=4]
FAIL: vic(member) UPDATE Acme ticket -> 0 rows (denied) [want=0 got=4]
FAIL: uma(admin) UPDATE Globex ticket -> 0 rows (not her org) [want=0 got=4]
FAIL: vic(member) DELETE Acme ticket -> 0 rows (denied) [want=0 got=4]
FAIL: uma(admin) DELETE own-org ticket (probe cleaned up) [want=1 got=4]

--- 3. ORG_MEMBERS VISIBILITY ---
FAIL: uma sees Acme member list (2 rows) [want=2 got=-1]
FAIL: vic sees Acme member list (2 rows) [want=2 got=-1]
FAIL: uma sees ZERO Globex members [want=0 got=-1]
FAIL: wen sees ZERO Acme members [want=0 got=-1]
FAIL: wen sees her own Globex membership (1 row) [want=1 got=-1]
PASS: anonymous sees ZERO org_members [got=0]
FAIL: wen cannot DELETE her own membership row (still present) [want=1 got=4]

--- 4. ORGS READABLE (unchanged) ---
PASS: anonymous can still READ orgs (2) [got=2]
PASS: uma can still READ orgs (2) [got=2]

--- 5. DATA INTEGRITY CHECK (unchanged) ---
FAIL: Acme still has exactly 3 tickets [want=3 got=4]
FAIL: Globex still has exactly 2 tickets [want=2 got=4]
FAIL: no probe rows left behind [want=0 got=4]

===================================
RESULT: PASS=8 FAIL=21

jq: error (at <stdin>:0): Cannot index string with string "org_id"
jq: error (at <stdin>:0): Cannot index object with number
jq: error (at <stdin>:0): Cannot index object with number
jq: error (at <stdin>:0): Cannot index object with number
jq: error (at <stdin>:0): Cannot index object with number

#8exit 0

ANON="$SUPABASE_ANON_KEY"; URL="$SUPABASE_URL"
UMA=$(curl -sS -X POST "$URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password" -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"email":"uma-admin@cari.dev","password":"Passw0rd-uma-11"}' | jq -r '.access_token // empty')
echo "token len: ${#UMA}"
echo "--- raw tickets response as uma:"
curl -sS "$URL/rest/v1/tickets?select=id,org_id,title" -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Authorization: Bearer $UMA"
echo; echo "--- raw org_members response as uma:"
curl -sS "$URL/rest/v1/org_members?select=org_id,role" -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Authorization: Bearer $UMA"

token len: 796
--- raw tickets response as uma:
{"code":"42501","details":null,"hint":null,"message":"permission denied for function is_org_member"}
--- raw org_members response as uma:
{"code":"42501","details":null,"hint":null,"message":"permission denied for function is_org_member"}

#9exit 0

export PGPASSWORD="$SUPABASE_DB_PASSWORD"
psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -X -v ON_ERROR_STOP=1 -c "GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.is_org_member(uuid) TO authenticated;" -c "GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION public.is_org_admin(uuid) TO authenticated;" && echo OK && psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -X -A -c "
SELECT p.proname, p.proacl, r.rolname AS owner, p.prosecdef
FROM pg_proc p JOIN pg_roles r ON r.oid=p.proowner
JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid=p.pronamespace
WHERE n.nspname='public' AND p.proname IN ('is_org_member','is_org_admin');"

GRANT
GRANT
OK
proname|proacl|owner|prosecdef
is_org_member|{postgres=X/postgres,service_role=X/postgres,authenticated=X/postgres}|postgres|t
is_org_admin|{postgres=X/postgres,service_role=X/postgres,authenticated=X/postgres}|postgres|t
(2 rows)

#10exit 0

/opt/rls/verify.sh 2>/tmp/jqerr.log; echo "--- jq stderr (should be empty):"; cat /tmp/jqerr.log

All 3 logins OK
Acme=f112a917-8dc5-4c87-baa3-b60922d2c6b2 Globex=0ca3dfe5-cc5d-4343-aee8-320e6ae03f46

--- 1. TICKET READS ---
PASS: uma(admin,Acme) reads Acme tickets: Fix login,Update billing,Rotate keys [got=3]
PASS: vic(member,Acme) reads Acme tickets [got=3]
PASS: wen(member,Globex) reads Globex tickets [got=2]
PASS: uma sees ZERO Globex tickets [got=0]
PASS: vic sees ZERO Globex tickets [got=0]
PASS: wen sees ZERO Acme tickets [got=0]
PASS: anonymous sees ZERO Acme tickets [got=0]
PASS: anonymous sees ZERO Globex tickets [got=0]

--- 2. TICKET WRITES ---
PASS: uma(admin) INSERT Acme ticket [got=201]
PASS: vic(member) INSERT Acme denied [got=403]
PASS: uma(admin) INSERT Globex denied (not her org) [got=403]
PASS: wen(member) INSERT Globex denied [got=403]
PASS: uma(admin) UPDATE own-org ticket [got=1]
PASS: vic(member) UPDATE Acme ticket -> 0 rows (denied) [got=0]
PASS: uma(admin) UPDATE Globex ticket -> 0 rows (not her org) [got=0]
PASS: vic(member) DELETE Acme ticket -> 0 rows (denied) [got=0]
PASS: uma(admin) DELETE own-org ticket (probe cleaned up) [got=1]

--- 3. ORG_MEMBERS VISIBILITY ---
PASS: uma sees Acme member list (2 rows) [got=2]
PASS: vic sees Acme member list (2 rows) [got=2]
PASS: uma sees ZERO Globex members [got=0]
PASS: wen sees ZERO Acme members [got=0]
PASS: wen sees her own Globex membership (1 row) [got=1]
PASS: anonymous sees ZERO org_members [got=0]
PASS: wen cannot DELETE her own membership row (still present) [got=1]

--- 4. ORGS READABLE (unchanged) ---
PASS: anonymous can still READ orgs (2) [got=2]
PASS: uma can still READ orgs (2) [got=2]

--- 5. DATA INTEGRITY CHECK (unchanged) ---
PASS: Acme still has exactly 3 tickets [got=3]
PASS: Globex still has exactly 2 tickets [got=2]
PASS: no probe rows left behind [got=0]

===================================
RESULT: PASS=29 FAIL=0
--- jq stderr (should be empty):

#11exit 0

export PGPASSWORD="$SUPABASE_DB_PASSWORD"
psql "$SUPABASE_DB_URL" -X -A -c "
SELECT o.name, count(t.id) AS tickets FROM public.orgs o LEFT JOIN public.tickets t ON t.org_id=o.id GROUP BY o.name ORDER BY o.name;
" -c "
SELECT count(*) AS probe_rows_left FROM public.tickets WHERE title LIKE '\_\_%probe%\_\_' OR title='\_\_rls_probe\_\_';
" -c "
SELECT tablename, policyname, cmd, roles FROM pg_policies WHERE schemaname='public' ORDER BY tablename, policyname;
"
echo "--- anon calling helper function directly (must be denied/return false):"
ANON="$SUPABASE_ANON_KEY"; URL="$SUPABASE_URL"
curl -sS -X POST "$URL/rest/v1/rpc/is_org_member" -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d "{\"p_org_id\":\"f112a917-8dc5-4c87-baa3-b60922d2c6b2\"}"
echo
echo "--- original Acme ticket titles intact:"
UMA=$(curl -sS -X POST "$URL/auth/v1/token?grant_type=password" -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"email":"uma-admin@cari.dev","password":"Passw0rd-uma-11"}' | jq -r '.access_token')
curl -sS "$URL/rest/v1/tickets?select=title,status&order=id" -H "apikey: $ANON" -H "Authorization: Bearer $UMA" | jq -c '.'

name|tickets
Acme|3
Globex|2
(2 rows)
probe_rows_left
0
(1 row)
tablename|policyname|cmd|roles
org_members|org_members_select_own_org|SELECT|{authenticated}
orgs|orgs_select_all|SELECT|{anon,authenticated}
tickets|tickets_delete_admin|DELETE|{authenticated}
tickets|tickets_insert_admin|INSERT|{authenticated}
tickets|tickets_select_member|SELECT|{authenticated}
tickets|tickets_update_admin|UPDATE|{authenticated}
(6 rows)
--- anon calling helper function directly (must be denied/return false):
{"code":"42501","details":null,"hint":null,"message":"permission denied for function is_org_member"}
--- original Acme ticket titles intact:
[{"title":"Fix login","status":"open"},{"title":"Update billing","status":"open"},{"title":"Rotate keys","status":"open"}]

What it said at the end

All checks pass at both the API and database level. Tenant isolation is fully enforced. ## Summary I enabled and configured Row-Level Security on the three multi-tenant tables and verified it end-to-end with real user JWTs. ### What was applied (single migration, `ON_ERROR_STOP`, committed atomically) **Two `SECURITY DEFINER` helper functions** (`public.is_org_member(uuid)`, `public.is_org_admin(uuid)`), owned by `postgres` with `search_path = public` set. Because they're owned by a superuser and bypass RLS internally, policies on `org_members` can self-reference without infinite recursion. `EXECUTE` is granted to `authenticated` (needed so policies can call them) but **revoked** from `PUBLIC`/`anon`, so anonymous callers get `permission denied` (verified). **RLS enabled** on `tickets`, `org_members`, and `orgs`, with explicit per-command policies: | Table | Policy | Rule | |---|---|---| | `tickets` | `tickets_select_member` | SELECT → any member of that ticket's org | | `tickets` | `tickets_insert_admin` | INSERT → only `role='admin'` of the org (`WITH CHECK`) | | `tickets` | `tickets_update_admin` | UPDATE → admin only (`USING` + `WITH CHECK`, so admins can't move tickets to another org) | | `tickets` | `tickets_delete_admin` | DELETE → admin only | | `org_members` | `org_members_select_own_org` | SELECT → only rows of orgs the caller belongs to; **no write policies** (membership changes stay server-side) | | `orgs` | `orgs_select_all` | SELECT → `anon` + `authenticated` (kept readable as instructed); no write policies | Anonymous has **no** tickets/org_members policies → sees nothing there; `service_role` bypasses RLS so backend operations are unaffected. ### Verification (29/29 API checks passed) - **Reads:** uma(admin) & vic(member) see Acme's 3 tickets; wen sees Globex's 2; each sees **0** of the other org; anonymous sees 0. - **Writes:** uma INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE on Acme = **allowed**; all writes by vic(member), wen, or uma-targeting-Globex = **denied** (403 / 0 rows). - **org_members:** members see only their own org's list (Acme=2, Globex=1 for wen), 0 of others; anonymous 0; wen cannot delete her own membership. - **orgs:** still readable by everyone (unchanged). - **Data integrity:** no changes — Acme still has exactly its 3 original tickets, Globex its 2, zero probe rows left behind (all test inserts were cleaned up and an edited title was restored).

5 earlier narration turn(s) are in the raw transcript.

How it was graded

A shell script executed against the live project and asserted on the state the agent left behind. No model judged another model.

exit 0 OK

Check it yourself

Raw transcript · Task definition and verifier · Every attempt